Abstract

Against a set of policy reforms to meet democratic criterion, public broadcasting in Malawi has in recent years been hit by crisis pertaining to control and ownership, content and funding. While pressure is growing to strengthen existing laws, little attention has been paid to unwritten laws embedded in everyday social practice governing the behaviour of actors in this policy area. This study elucidates how informal institutions undermine the effective implementation of public policy in Malawi using the case of public broadcasting regulation. Using a qualitative approach relying on multiple data sources namely key informant interviews and document analysis, the study reveals that informal institutions both undermine and complement formal institutions in public broadcasting policy implementation. Trust in ‘ political big men’, party based networks, chiponda and informal labour market institutions undermine effective implementation of formal public broadcasting policy in Malawi while issue networks and informal funding mechanism are complementing the work of formal institutions. Notably, the ‘big man’ is a central institution that builds impetus for other informal institutions regardless of whether they supplement or supplant existing formal rules. The study findings challenge present emphasis on formal institutional reforms. The study suggests that weaknesses in the formal institution should be looked at as an incentive for the emergence of informal institutions which can explain the apparent failure in public broadcasting regulation. The study suggests that manipulating the supply of labour, through training, will increase opportunities for the mobility of employees that, in turn, will create incentives for adherence to formal institutions by making the sector more competitive.

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School	: School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Issued Date	: 2010

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